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FEDt-RAL I MPLOYEE PRECLUDED FROM OBTAINING REDRESS IN COURT
FOR TORTIOUS INJURIES CAUSED BY CO-WORKER
Van Houten r. Rails, 411 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1969)
Plaintiff, a government employee and a passenger in an automobile
driven by a fellow employee, was injured when the auto collided with
a vehicle driven by a third government employee. All three employees
were acting within the scope of their employment. Plaintiff originally
brought a tort action in federal district court, naming the United States
and the to drivers as defendants. The court granted the United States
summary judgment. It held that the only remedy a government
employee injured in the course of his employment has against the
United States is statutory compensation under the Federal Employee's
Compensation Act (FECA).1 The suit against the drivers was dismissed
for want of diversity. The drivers had argued that the suit should be
dismissed because, by the terms of the Federal Drivers Act (FDA),2 suit
against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act is
"exclusive of any other civil remedy." In dictum the court indicated
that this argument would have failed. As the summary judgment ruling
indicated, because statutory compensation is his sole remedy against
the United States, the injured employee could not sue the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act; this, however, is the exclusive
remedy to which he is referred by the Federal Drivers Act. To apply
the referral provisions of section b of the FDA to government
employees would leave them without a tort remedy. To preserve the
plaintiff's tort remedy he could sue the individual drivers in state
court."
Van Houten then brought the instant suit against the driver-
defendants in a Nevada state court. On certification of the Attorney
General that the driver-defendants were acting within the scope of their
employment,' and that under section b of the FDA5 the United States
1 5 5( k 8101 et. sq. (Supp. IV 1969).
2 28 U , ( 2679b)-(e) (Supp. IV 1969.
3. Van ltoutcn v, Rails. 290 F Supp 67, 68 (D C. Nev. 1967). The opinion in the first Federal
Court determination in this case ssas not printed. Therefore the references are made to the second
district court dcci'ion %hich describes the first.
4. id) Lpon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was
acting itbin the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the
suit arose, any such civil action or proceeding commenced in a state court shall be removed
%ithout bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the
t nited States fbr the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending and
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was the only proper defendant, the suit was removed to federal court.
Plaintiff moved for a remand. Relying on the court's previous dictum,
he argued that since a tort remedy was not available against the
government, the case should be remanded for trial in state court against
the individual defendants.' To support his argument the plaintiff relied
on section d of the FDA, which provides that if ". . . a remedy by
suit within the meaning of subsection (b) . . .is not available against
the United States, the case shall be remanded . . ." The district court,
repudiating its previous dictum, denied the plaintiff's motion for
remand. On motion by the United States, which was substituted as
defendant under section b, it dismissed the suit,' holding that plaintiffs
exclusive remedy against the government was statutory compensation
under the FECA. Plaintiff appealed.
Held: FDA section d, which provides for a remand ' if a remedy by
suit is not available against the United States, is only applicable if the
driver was acting outside the scope of his governmental employment;"
the proceedings deemed a tort action brought against the United States under the
provisions of this title and all references thereto. Should a United States district court
determine on a hearing on a motion to remand held before trial on the merits that the
case so removed is one in which a remedy by suit within the meaning of subsection (b) of
this section is not available against the United States, the case shall be remanded to the
State court.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (Supp. IV 1969).
5. (b) The remedy by suit against the United States as provided by section 1346(b) of this
title [Federal Tort Claims Act] for damages to property or for personal injury, including
death, resulting from the operation by an employee of the Government of any motor
vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or employment, shall hereafter be
exclusive of any other civil remedy or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter
against the employee or his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1964). See also, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), which reads:
.. .the district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States for money damages . .. for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under the circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
6. Van Houten v. Rails, 290 F. Supp. 67, 68 (D.C. Nev. 1967).
7. See note 4, supra.
8. Van Houten v. Rails, 290 F. S9pp. 67, 69 (D.C. Nev. 1967). In reaching a conclusion which
indicated an apparent about face the judge noted that an order granting the motion to remand
would not be appealable and therefore the issue of the exclusivity of the remedy against the United
States would not be resolved; in granting the motion to dismiss he invited appeal to the Ninth
Circuit for a definitive ruling. Id. at 68-69.
9. See note 4, supra.
10. Van Houten v. Rails, 411 F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1969).
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if the driver was acting within the scope of his employment, the
employee-plaintiff's only remedy is statutory compensation."
Affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in
Vantreave i,. United States2 in which the same result was reached on
similar facts. The Sixth Circuit read the FDA, the FECA and the
Federal Tort Claims Act together. It found that Congress intended the
remand provision of the FDA to be applicable only when the
government driver was acting outside the scope of his employment.13
When the driver defendant was acting within the scope of his
employment, Congress intended that no tort remedy lie against the
negligent driver or the United States." The injured employee is limited
to statutory compensation under the FECA. 15
In most cases, a significant monetary loss to the plaintiff will occur
when his recovery is limited to statutory compensation.16 For example,
in a recent case on facts similar to Van Houten, the plaintiff received
a jury award of $30,000 contrasted with compensation under the
FECA of only $8,577.02.' 7 To illustrate the curious statutory
interaction which produces this result, it can be noted that with a slight
variation of the facts, Van Houten's possible tort recovery would have
been preserved.
(1) Had plaintiff been a private citizen injured by a federal employee
acting within the scope of his employment, plaintiff either could have
sued the employee in tort' or the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act." If the accident had been an automobile accident, the
II. Id at 9 4 3.
12 400 I- 2d853 (1968).
13 Al at 95s.
14. Id The Ninth Circuit in lIan Houten stated that:
The federal legislative objective . . . was apparently to protect federal drivers from
personal liability by rendering the government liable in tort, in the case of non-federal
employee plaintiflfs, and by rendering the government liable only under the FECA in the
case of lederal employee-plaintiffs.
Van Houten v. Rails, 411 F.2d 940,943 (9th Cir, 1969).
15. [he schedule of benefits conferred under the FECA is contained in 5 U.S.C. §§ 8105-07
(Supp IV 1969).
16 \' e I A LNRSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 2.50 (1967).
17. Gilliam v. United States, 407 F.2d 818. 820 (6th Cir, 1969) (concurring opinion).
18 L if V, estern v. McGehee. 202 F Supp. 287, 292 (D.C. Md. 1962); Irvin v. United States,
148 F Supp 25, 33 (D.C.S.D. 1957) (dictum); Henning v. Ebersole, 8 Misc. 2d 788, 789, 166
N Y S 2d 167, 169 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
19 28 Ii S C § 1346(b) (1964).
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FDA would require that the government defend in an action brought
against the employee."
(2) Had plaintiff, as a government employee, been injured by
another government employee in a non-auto accident, he could have
recovered under both the FECA and in a private civil suit brought
directly against the other employee .2 The subrogation provisions of the
FECA, however, would limit the plaintiff to the higher of the
recoveries.22
(3) Had plaintiff, as a government employee, been injured by the
negligence of a private party, he could have recovered both from the
government under the FECA and from the negligent party in a private
civil suit,?' with the recovery limited to the higher amount. 4
But Van Houten's case fit none of these fact patterns. Consequently,
he was deprived of the opportunity to sue in tort."
Three cases decided on the appellate level are in agreement with the
holding of Van Houten.26 One district court has twice reached a
contrary result, but its most recent decision was reversed on appeal.
In a state court case, after a federal district court had remanded,
holding no tort remedy was available against the United States, the
20. There of course is the usual requirement that the act complained of be within the scope of
the employee's federal employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1964).
21. Marion v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 320, 323-24 (D.C. Md. 1963) (involving an
automobile accident, but the cause of action arose prior to the passage of the FDA and therelore
the act was not controlling). See also Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir, 1962).
22. See5 U.S.C. §§ 8131-32 (Supp. IV 1969).
23. E.g., Parr v. United States, 172 F.2d 462, 463 (10th Cir. 1949).
24. See note 22, supra. Had the defendant been in a contractual relationship with the United
States it could have, in the proper case, joined the United States as third party defendant for
indemnification; nothing in the FECA exclusivity provision prevents this. Newport Air Park, Inc.
v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.C.R.I. 1968); Hart v. Simons, 223 I. Supp. 109 (LD.
Pa. 1963). But see Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 19 6 8). See also Annot..
17 L. Ed. 2d 929, 943 (1967).
25. Under the common law "fellow servant" rule a person in the position of plaintiff here
would find that his exclusive right to remedy was against his co-worker and not against their
mutual employer. The fellow servant liability rule is preserved in Nevada. NI-v. Ri v.
STAT. § 41.130 (1967).
26. Noga v. United States, 411 F.2d 943 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 90 S.Ct. 104 (1969); Gilliam
v. United States, 407 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1969); Vantrease v. United States, 400 F.2d 853 (6th
Cir. 1968).
27. Gilliam v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Ken. 1967), rev'd, 407 F.2d 818 (6th Cir,
1969); Green v. Short, No. 1107 (E.D. Ken. 12 Feb. 1965) quoted in part in Gilliam v. United
States, 264 F. Supp. 7, 8-9 (E.D. Ken. 1967). Another district court reached a result in accord
with the Van Houten case, but the government's motion for summary judgment was not opposcd
and the case is therefore of dubious value as precedent. Beechwood v. United States, 264 1F. Supp.
926 (D.C. Mont. 1967).
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state Supreme Court, construing the FDA, held there was no remedy
available against the drivers"
Compensation in the form of tort recovery is a fundamental aspect
of Anglo-American law .2- Even when the fellow servant rule barred an
action based on respondeat superior, an injured employee could sue the
tortfeasor himself.' The existence of this common law remedy creates
a presumption favoring tort recovery. The presumption should not be
abrogated k ithout the expression of a clear Congressional intent to do
To o'ercome the presumption and find that a government employee
is barred from suing either the government or his co-worker, a court
must adopt two major premises: (1) that no government employee may
recover tort damages against the United States for injuries sustained
during the course of his employment, and (2) that when injured by the
negligence of a government driver, a person's only redress is against
the United States. Each of these premises can be supported separately.
But in accepting the individual premises on which the FDA and FECA
are based, the appellate courts have not explicitly considered the
inequities that arise from their interaction.
The Ninth Circuit applies these two premises in the Van Houten
case. and concludes: (1) the government employee is denied the right
to bring suit against the government driver; and (2) because of the
FE( \. the employee is denied the alternative remedy under the FDA,
28 Pohhuk Bcaun, - Tenn. -. 444 S.V.2d 140 (1969). There plaintiff first brought
suit in ltate court, hut the case 'as remoxed to United States District Court under the FDA and
the L ntcd States xkaNsubstituted as defendant. The district judge found that the plaintiff had no
remed\ against the United States under the FTCA because he was a serviceman; a motion by
the t nted slate. for summary judgment %%as denied and instead plaintiff-s motion to remand
was granted %,hen the action was returned to state court, plaintiff won a judgment for $42,500
again.! his co-".orkvr The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed, holding that the defendant was
immunc trom personal sult by %lrtue of the FDA. The court said that the remand order of the
federal .ourt a, concuxe only as to the right of the plaintiff to recover against the United
States under the I T[- \ The court relied on Vantrease v. United States, 400 F.2d 853 (6th Cir,
19681, authority for its dismissal. Polishuk v. Beavin, - Tenn. _. 444 S.W.2d 140, 144
(1969
19 / \shb ' White 92 Eng. Rep. 126. 136 (1703). See generally W. PROSSER.
I{AIHK O1, MiII I IkA ()I TORis 1-7 (3d cd. 1964); Seavey, Principles ol Torts. 56 HARV. L.
Ruv - -74 (1942)_
30 \,. V PRovSR. H ,,DBOOK OF THE LNxw OF TORTS 551-54 (3d ed. 1964), and cases cited
therein
31 It i, . popular maxim of statutory construction that "[sitatutes in derogation of the
common la" %kill not be e\tended bN construction." Llewellyn, Remarks on the TheorY oJ
Ippelal, I,, , wu opId the Rukh or (woolnis ahout how Statutes are to be Construed. 3 V'AND.
L Ri% 395 4o)1 I9O) [hercinafter cited as Llekxelliln Remarks].
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suit against the United States. This conclusion creates a contradiction
within the FDA: a common law right to sue the tortfeasor is destroyed
and replaced by a statutory right to sue the tortfeasor's employer, the
government. But in the case of the government employee-plaintiff, the
substitute remedy is illusory. Under the FECA, he cannot sue the
government. The inequity of the result, 2 combined with the agrogation
of a traditional common law right, opens the courts to criticism for
failing to make a careful ekamination of alternative statutory
interpretations.
Though the Van Houten court relies on the intent of Congress, a
careful study of the reports and debates surrounding the passage of the
FDA demonstrates that Congress never considered whether the FECA
and the FDA might be read together to eliminate the right of an injured
government employee to sue in tort. Since Congress did not consider
the specific situation, the debates and reports are ambiguous. They
could be read as demonstrating that Congress did not intend to limit
an employee-plaintiff to statutory compensation as well as supporting
the Van Houten decision. 33  11
The statute could have been interpreted in at least three ways to
preserve the right of the injured employee to sue in tort. All of these
interpretations are consistent with the normal rules of statutory
construction, and, perhaps, the intent of Congress.
(1) The court could have read the remand provision literally.3" Van
Houten had no remedy by suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, and therefore had a right to sue the
employees in state court.
(2) It could also have been held that the "remedy by suit" provision
of the FDA repeals the exclusivity provision of the FECA in so far as
suits by employees injured by federal drivers are concerned. 5 The
32. The Sixth Circuit in Vantrease concluded: "[W]e cannot agree that a single remedy against
the United States-here the receipt of compensation benefits-is manifestly inequitable as to
plaintiff." Vantrease v. United States, 400 F.2d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 1968). But see, Combs, J.,
concurring in Gilliam: "I concur but I do so reluctantly because I think we can reach an
inequitable result. Congress has very properly immunized from personal liability Government
employee-drivers on claims arising from vehicular accidents. But someone needs to look at the
other side of the coin." Gilliam v. United States, 497 F.2d 818, 819 (6th Cir. 1969).
33. The same conclusion is reached by Combs, J., concurring in Gilliam v. United States, 407
F.2d 818, 819 (6th Cir, 1969); Note, Federal Employees Compensation Act as Barring Suit Utnder
Section 2679 of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 2 VAL. L. REv. 108, 113 (1968). See S. Rup. No.
736, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); 107 Cong. Rec. 18, 499-500 (1961).
34. "If language is plain and unambiguous, it must be given effect." Llewellyn, RemarAs at
403.
35. "[l]f there is a conflict between two statutes relating to the same subject which cannot be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/6
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conflicting provisions in the two statutes would be resolved in favor of
the statute later in point of time, i.e. the FDA. It can be argued that
Congress was interested in protecting driver employees, not in depriving
the driver and all other employees of their right to sue in tort.31
(3) Finally, it could have been held that the substitution of the
United States was merely a technical one. Instead of being the actual
defendant, the government could be found to "'stand in the shoes" of
the employee-defendant. Alternatively, the government may be
characterized as an insurer. Under either interpretation the right of
action arising from the employee's negligence would not be destroyed.
A version of this approach was adopted by the only Federal Court to
find for the plaintiff under similar facts .3  Alternative versions of the
FDA introduced before final passage lend support to a theory that the
United States is to be treated as an insurer. These forms of the FDA
would have the government either purchase insurance for its drivers or
in the alternative reimburse the drivers for insurance obtained at their
own expense.- By providing for a direct remedy against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and making it the exclusive
remedy, these provisions seemed unnecessary.
The argument for a literal interpretation of the remand provision
allowing the plaintiff to bring an action in state court by lifting the
alleged protective veil of the FDA (first alternative) is the single
argument to have been considered by the courts. Since this would
destroy the government driver's immunity and frustrate the protective
intent of Congress, it was rejected.3
reconciled b. an), fair and reasonable method of construction, the last in point of time will
control "" H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAWS 325 (l911),
36 See 107 Cong. Rec. 18,499-501 (1961).
37 Delivering an oral opinion in Green v. Short. the district court judge said:
Miss Green did hase a right of action, a common law right of action, against Mr. Short
for personal injuries. . . If the United States came in and undertook to supplant itself
as defendant for the original defendant and to discharge its obligation to him, then the
I nited States could not claim that it Aas therefore being sued, because it had not been
sued
Green v Short, No 1107 (E.D. Ken. 12 Feb. 1965), quoted in Gilliam v. United States, 264 F.
Supp 7.9 (L I) Ken. 1967).
38 S. RFP No 736, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961). See also Thornock, Exclusive Remedy
Provwiom ot the Federal Employees Compensation Act-Fact or Fiction, 42 MIL. L.
RE% 1 (1968) Ahich argues for the technical substitution viewpoint.
39 [here is alfs an unanssered question of whether the FDA deprives a plaintiff of due process
of la%& h% destro\ing his right to sue a co-,orker. The argument was rejected in Noga v. United
States, 411 - 2d 943 (9th Cir.). (ert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 104 (1969), because the plaintiff brought
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Dissolution of the FECA immunity for the government (second
alternative) or the technical substitution of the government as
defendant (third alternative) have not been considered by the courts.
However, these alternatives seem particularly viable, since they
maintain Congressionally intended protection of the federal driver,
while preserving the individual employee's right to sue in tort.
The interpretation the courts'have given to the interaction of these
federal protective and compensatory statutes leaves the injured
government employee with only the FECA to compensate him for
injuries suffered at the hands of another government employee. The
FECA was never intended to be a complete remedy for an injury
caused by the neglect of another."
If the courts cannot be convinced to rethink this anomaly when it
next comes up for review, Congress should be induced to review the
inequities that have become apparent since the passage of the FDA,
The government employee-plaintiff, by an unfortunate combination of
circumstances, is deprived of a right to obtain redress in the courts
when he has been injured by the negligence of a government driver.
his action directly against the United States and not against the individual employee- the court
held that there was no common law right to sue the government and therefore plaintiff was not
deprived of due process. But the court added, "Whether the Federal Drivers Act, in insulating
federal drivers from pre-existing common law right of action for damages brought by a fellow
employee, constitutes a deprivation of due process, is a question not presented here since Noga
did not sue the driver." Id. at 945. Van Houten and Vantrease did sue the drivers, but the due
process argument was not raised on either appeal.
40. See I A. LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 2.50 (1967).
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